A full day of cryptography talks in the Paris area.

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The first Paris Area Crypto Day will be held on 16.02.16 (Tues) at ENS.

- Amphi Rataud, ENS
- Please register (free, lunch included). Deadline 11.02.16

10:00 - 10:10 | Welcome |

10:10 - 11:10 | Antoine Joux Technical History of Discrete Logarithms in Small Characteristic Finite Fields |

11:20 - 11:40 | Romain Gay Tightly Secure CCA-Secure Encryption without Pairings |

11:40 - 12:00 | Pierrick Méaux Towards Stream Ciphers for Efficient FHE with Low-Noise Ciphertexts |

12:00 - 14:00 | Lunch |

14:00 - 15:00 | Sonia Belaïd On the Use of Masking to Defeat Power-Analysis Attacks |

15:00 - 15:20 | Alain Passelègue Randomness Complexity of Private Circuits for Multiplication |

15:20 - 15:50 | Coffee Break |

15:50 - 16:50 | Karthikeyan Bhargavan Freak, Logjam, and Sloth: Protecting TLS from Legacy Crypto |

**Organizers.** Michel Abdalla and Hoeteck Wee (ENS)

**Acknowledgements.** ERC CryptoCloud and aSCEND

**Technical History of Discrete Logarithms in Small Characteristic Finite Fields**
*Antoine Joux*

Due to its use in cryptographic protocols such as the Diffie–Hellman key exchange, the discrete logarithm problem attracted a considerable amount of attention in the past 40 years. In this talk, we summarize the key technical ideas and their evolution for the case of discrete logarithms in small characteristic finite fields. This road leads from the original belief that this problem was hard enough for cryptographic purpose to the current state of the art where the algorithms are so efficient and practical that the problem can no longer be considered for cryptographic use.

**On the Use of Masking to Defeat Power-Analysis Attacks**
*Sonia Belaïd*

While most cryptographic algorithms are assumed to be secure against black-box attacks, they are often vulnerable to side-channel attacks which exploit the physical emanations of the underlying device (e.g., temperature, power consumption, time). In order to defeat such attacks, several countermeasures have been exhibited within the last two decades. So far, the most deployed one at the algorithmic level is probably the use of masking. It consists in randomly splitting each sensitive variable of the computation into t+1 shares, where the masking order t represents the security level. While this countermeasure is very efficient in practice, it can be complex to design while t grows. During this talk, I will discuss the current issues to build higher-order masking schemes and the solutions that currently show up. In particular, I will present the construction of theoretical proofs to show the security of such schemes in the widely used t-probing leakage model.

**Freak, Logjam, and Sloth: Protecting TLS from Legacy Crypto**
*Karthikeyan Bhargavan*

The Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol suffers from legacy bloat: after 20 years of evolution, it features many versions, extensions, and ciphersuites, some of which are obsolete and known to be insecure. Implementations and deployments of TLS deal with this complexity by implementing composite state machines that allow new and old features to coexist for interoperability, while waiting for deprecated features to be disabled over time. Getting this composition right is tricky, and any flaw can result in a serious attack that bypasses the expected security of TLS.

This talk will discuss three recent vulnerabilities discovered in our group: FREAK uses legacy support for export-grade RSA cipher suites to break into connections between mainstream browsers and 25% of the web; Logjam exploits a protocol flaw to confuse DHE key exchanges into using export-grade Diffie-Hellman groups; SLOTH exploits hash function collisions to mount downgrade and impersonation attacks on TLS. These attacks rely on a combination of protocol-level weaknesses, implementation bugs, and weak cryptography. The talk will advocate principled methods to avoid such weaknesses in the future, such as software verification and new robust designs for new protocols like TLS 1.3.

**Tightly Secure CCA-Secure Encryption without Pairings**
*Romain Gay*

We present the first CCA-secure public-key encryption scheme based on DDH where the security loss is independent of the number of challenge ciphertexts and the number of decryption queries. Our construction extends also to the standard k-Lin assumption in pairing-free groups, whereas all prior constructions starting with Hofheinz and Jager (Crypto ‘12) rely on the use of pairings. Moreover, our construction improves upon the concrete efficiency of existing schemes, reducing the ciphertext overhead by about half (to only 3 group elements under DDH), in addition to eliminating the use of pairings. We also show how to use our techniques in the NIZK setting. Specifically, we construct the first tightly simulation-sound designated-verifier NIZK for linear languages without pairings. Using pairings, we can turn our construction into a highly optimized publicly verifiable NIZK with tight simulation-soundness.

Joint work with Dennis Hofheinz, Eike Kiltz and Hoeteck Wee

**Towards Stream Ciphers for Efficient FHE with Low-Noise Ciphertexts**
*Pierrick Méaux*

Symmetric ciphers purposed for Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) have recently been proposed for two main reasons. First, minimizing the implementation (time and memory) overheads that are inherent to current FHE schemes. Second, improving the homomorphic capacity, i.e. the amount of operations that one can perform on homomorphic ciphertexts before bootstrapping, which amounts to limit their level of noise. Existing solutions for this purpose suggest a gap between block ciphers and stream ciphers. The first ones typically allow a constant but small homomorphic capacity, due to the iteration of rounds eventually leading to complex Boolean functions (hence large noise). The second ones typically allow a larger homomorphic capacity for the first ciphertext blocks, that decreases with the number of ciphertext blocks (due to the increasing Boolean complexity of the stream ciphers’ output). In this work, we aim to combine the best of these two worlds, and propose a new stream cipher construction that allows constant and small(er) noise. Its main idea is to apply a Boolean (filter) function to a public bit permutation of a constant key register, so that the Boolean complexity of its outputs is constant. We then propose an instantiation of the filter designed to exploit recent (3rd-generation) FHE schemes, where the error growth is quasi-additive when adequately multiplying ciphertexts with the same amount of noise. We finally analyze the cryptanalytic security and noise of a couple of instances of this stream cipher, and conclude by highlighting its excellent properties regarding the other goal of minimizing the time and memory complexity of calculus delegation (for 2nd-generation FHE schemes).

Joint work with Anthony Journault, François-Xavier Standaert and Claude Carlet.

**Randomness Complexity of Private Circuits for Multiplication**
*Alain Passelègue*

Many cryptographic algorithms appear to be vulnerable to side channel analysis and several leakage models have been introduced to better understand these analyses. In 2003, Ishai, Sahai and Wagner introduced the $d$-probing security model, in which an attacker can observe at most $d$ intermediate values during a processing. They also proposed an algorithm that securely performs the multiplication of 2 bits in this model, using only $d(d+1)/2$ random bits to protect the computation. The $d$-probing model and the latter multiplication algorithm are nowadays widely used by the community to either prove the security of constructions or to define secure implementations.

In this paper, we study the randomness complexity of multiplication algorithms secure in the $d$-probing model. On this subject, we propose several contributions: we provide new theoretical characterizations and constructions, new practical constructions and a new efficient algorithmic tool to analyze the security of such schemes.

We first start by a theoretical treatment of the subject: we propose an algebraic model for multiplication algorithms and exhibit an algebraic characterization of the security in the $d$-probing model. Using this algebraic characterization, we prove a linear (in $d$) lower bound as well as a quasi-linear (non-constructive) upper bound for this randomness cost. This characterization also allows us to better understand the security of a multiplication algorithm and we construct a new generic algorithm to perform secure multiplication in the $d$-probing model that only uses $d + d^2/4$ random bits.

From a practical point of view, we consider the important cases $d \le 4$ that are actually used in real-life implementations and we build optimal algorithms for these small-order cases. More precisely, we propose algorithms with a randomness complexity matching our theoretical lower bound. Finally, still using our algebraic characterization, we provide a new dedicated verification tool, based on information set decoding, which aims at finding attacks on algorithms for fixed order $d$ at a very low computational cost.

Joint work with Sonia Belaïd, Fabrice Benhamouda, Emmanuel Prouff, Adrian Thillard, and Damien Vergnaud.